Timothée Waxin

@article{belot_1884,

title = {Mandatory employee board representation: Good news for family firms?},

author = {François Belot and Timothée Waxin},

url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818822000400},

year  = {2022},

date = {2022-09-01},

journal = {International Review Of Law And Economics},

volume = {71},

pages = {106084},

abstract = {We assess the corporate performance and corporate governance consequences of mandatory employee board representation through a natural experiment: the passage of the 2015 Rebsamen law in France, which requires 1 or 2 board seats to be allocated to employee representatives. We hypothesize that such formal institutional arrangements to give workers a voice in corporate governance are irrelevant for family firms, which have been shown to commit to implicit contracts with their employees. We find evidence that affected family firms' share prices reacted negatively to the passage of the law. Moreover, standard OLS regressions of operating performance suggest that family control neutralizes the positive effect associated with employee directors. A more sophisticated difference-in-differences approach shows that affected family firms experienced a significant subsequent decrease in their return on assets. Our investigations of board composition also suggest that family firms rely on avoidance strategies to offset the influence of employee representatives. Overall, this paper casts doubt on the efficiency of minority worker representation in the boardrooms of family-owned companies and thus cautions against a ?one-size-fits-all? approach to corporate governance practices.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{waxin_1267,

title = {Family control, stock price levels and stock split activity},

author = {Timothée Waxin and François Belot},

url = {https://www.cairn.info/revue-finance-2021-1-page-155.htm},

year  = {2021},

date = {2021-05-01},

journal = {Finance},

volume = {42},

number = {1},

pages = {155-219},

abstract = {We investigate the impact of family control on both the share price level and the decision to split the firm's stock. Low stock prices are associated with higher volatility and have been shown to attract more speculative trading, which may force managers to excessively focus on short-term earnings. Moreover, a reduction in the stock price level can hurt the firm's reputational capital. We hypothesize that family owners, who are typically long-term investors and are especially concerned about corporate reputation, prefer to set higher stock prices to mitigate short-termism, focus on long-term planning, and reinforce the firm's image. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2016, we find a positive correlation between share prices and family control. Our investigations also indicate that family firms are less likely to conduct price reductions through stock splits. These findings suggest that a high stock price is a distinctive feature of family firms and that family owners have a specific norm in mind with respect to prices.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{belot_1279,

title = {Labor Conflicts in French Workplaces: Does (the Type of) Family Control Matter?},

author = {François Belot and Timothée Waxin},

url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10551-015-2937-1},

year  = {2017},

date = {2017-12-01},

journal = {Journal Of Business Ethics},

volume = {146},

number = {3},

pages = {591-617},

abstract = {x},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}

@article{ginglinger_1937,

title = {Employee ownership, board representation, and corporate financial policies},

author = {Edith Ginglinger and William Megginson and Timothée Waxin},

url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119911000204},

year  = {2011},

date = {2011-09-01},

journal = {Journal Of Corporate Finance},

volume = {17},

number = {4},

pages = {868-887},

abstract = {French law mandates that employees of publicly listed companies can elect two types of directors to represent employees. Privatized companies must reserve board seats for directors elected by employees by right of employment, while employee-shareholders can elect a director whenever they hold at least 3% of outstanding shares. Using a comprehensive sample of firms in the Société des Bourses Françaises (SBF) 120 Index from 1998 to 2008, we examine the impact of employee-directors on corporate valuation, payout policy, and internal board organization and performance. We find that directors elected by employee shareholders increase firm valuation and profitability, but do not significantly impact corporate payout policy. Directors elected by employees by right significantly reduce payout ratios, but do not impact firm value or profitability. Employee representation on corporate boards thus appears to be at least value-neutral, and perhaps value-enhancing in the case of directors elected by employee shareholders.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {article}

}