Quoc Huy Vu

@inproceedings{chevalier_2600,

title = {Semi-quantum Copy-Protection and More},

author = {Céline Chevalier and Paul Hermouet and Quoc Huy VU},

url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-48624-1_6},

issn = {978-3-031-48624-1},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-01},

booktitle = {Theory of Cryptography Conference},

address = {Taipei, Taiwan},

abstract = {Properties of quantum mechanics have enabled the emergence of quantum cryptographic protocols achieving important goals which are proven to be impossible classically. Unfortunately, this usually comes at the cost of needing quantum power from every party in the protocol, while arguably a more realistic scenario would be a network of classical clients, classically interacting with a quantum server.



In this paper, we focus on copy-protection, which is a quantum primitive that allows a program to be evaluated, but not copied, and has shown interest especially due to its links to other unclonable cryptographic primitives. Our main contribution is to show how to dequantize quantum copy-protection schemes constructed from hidden coset states, by giving a construction for classically-instructed remote state preparation for coset states, which preserves hardness properties of hidden coset states. We then apply this dequantizer to obtain semi-quantum cryptographic protocols for copy-protection and tokenized signatures with strong unforgeability. In the process, we present the first secure copy-protection scheme for point functions in the plain model and a new direct product hardness property of coset states which immediately implies a strongly unforgeable tokenized signature scheme.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inproceedings}

}

@inproceedings{do_2554,

title = {zk-SNARKs from Codes with Rank Metrics},

author = {Xuan-Thanh Do and Dang-Truong Mac and Quoc Huy VU},

url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-47818-5_6},

issn = {978-3-031-47818-5},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-01},

booktitle = {IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding},

address = {London, UK},

abstract = {Succinct non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge (zk-SNARKs) are a type of non-interactive proof system enabling efficient privacy-preserving proofs of membership for NP languages. A great deal of works has studied candidate constructions that are secure against quantum attackers, which are based on either lattice assumptions, or post-quantum collision-resistant hash functions. In this paper, we propose a code-based zk-SNARK scheme, whose security is based on the rank support learning (RSL) problem, a variant of the random linear code decoding problem in the rank metric. 

Our construction follows the general framework of Gennaro et al. (CCS'18), which is based on square span programs (SSPs). Due to the fundamental differences between the hardness assumptions, our proof of security cannot apply the techniques from the lattice-based constructions, and indeed, it distinguishes itself by the use of techniques from coding theory. We also provide the scheme with a set of concrete parameters.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inproceedings}

}

@inproceedings{barooti_2599,

title = {Public-Key Encryption with Quantum Keys},

author = {Khashayar Barooti and Alex B. Grilo and Loïs Huguenin-Dumittan and Giulio Malavolta and Or Sattath and Quoc Huy VU and Michael Walter},

url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1007/978-3-031-48624-1_8},

issn = {978-3-031-48623-4},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-12-01},

booktitle = {Theory of Cryptography Conference},

address = {Taipei, Taiwan},

abstract = {In the framework of Impagliazzo's five worlds, a distinction is often made between two worlds, one where public-key encryption exists (Cryptomania), and one in which only one-way functions exist (MiniCrypt). However, the boundaries between these worlds can change when quantum information is taken into account. Recent work has shown that quantum variants of oblivious transfer and multi-party computation, both primitives that are classically in Cryptomania, can be constructed from one-way functions, placing them in the realm of quantum MiniCrypt (the so-called MiniQCrypt). This naturally raises the following question: Is it possible to construct a quantum variant of public-key encryption, which is at the heart of Cryptomania, from one-way functions or potentially weaker assumptions? In this work, we initiate the formal study of the notion of quantum public-key encryption (qPKE), i.e., public-key encryption where keys are allowed to be quantum states. We propose new definitions of security and several constructions of qPKE based on the existence of one-way functions (OWF), or even weaker assumptions, such as pseudorandom function-like states (PRFS) and pseudorandom function-like states with proof of destruction (PRFSPD). Finally, to give a tight characterization of this primitive, we show that computational assumptions are necessary to build quantum public-key encryption. That is, we give a self-contained proof that no quantum public-key encryption scheme can provide information-theoretic security.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inproceedings}

}

@inproceedings{chevalier_2601,

title = {On Security Notions for Encryption in a Quantum World},

author = {Céline Chevalier and Ehsan Ebrahimi and Quoc Huy VU},

url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-22912-1_26},

issn = {978-3-031-22912-1},

year  = {2023},

date = {2023-01-01},

booktitle = {International Conference on Cryptology in India},

address = {Kolkata, India},

abstract = {Indistinguishability against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) is usually considered the most desirable security notion for classical encryption. In this work, we investigate its adaptation in the quantum world, when an adversary can perform superposition queries. The security of quantum-secure classical encryption has first been studied by Boneh and Zhandry (CRYPTO'13), but they restricted the adversary to classical challenge queries, which makes the indistinguishability only hold for classical messages (IND-qCCA2). We extend their work by giving the first security notions for fully quantum indistinguishability under quantum adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, where the indistinguishability holds for superposition of plaintexts (qIND-qCCA2).},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inproceedings}

}

@inproceedings{blazy_2604,

title = {Post-Quantum UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer in the Standard Model with Adaptive Corruptions},

author = {Olivier Blazy and Céline Chevalier and Quoc Huy VU},

url = {https://dl.acm.org/doi/abs/10.1145/3339252.3339280},

issn = {978-1-4503-7164-3},

year  = {2019},

date = {2019-08-01},

booktitle = {International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security},

address = {Canterbury, United Kingdom},

abstract = {Since the seminal result of Kilian, Oblivious Transfer (OT) has proven to be a fundamental primitive in cryptography. In such a scheme, a user is able to gain access to an element owned by a server, without learning more than this single element, and without the server learning which element the user has accessed. The NIST call for post-quantum encryption and signature schemes has revived the interest for cryptographic protocols based on post-quantum assumptions and the need for secure post-quantum OT schemes. In this paper, we show how to construct an OT scheme based on lattices, from a collision-resistant chameleon hash scheme (CH) and a CCA encryption scheme accepting a smooth projective hash function (SPHF). Note that our scheme does not rely on random oracles and provides UC security against adaptive corruptions assuming reliable erasures.},

keywords = {},

pubstate = {published},

tppubtype = {inproceedings}

}